紹介
New Institutional Economics open a new methodological perspective in political economy by posing the question of why economic institutions are created. This state-of-the-art collection examines this question of Arrow's looking at how these man-made constraints condition political, economic and social integration both informally and formally. New developments in game theory are applied to many case topical studies including corruption, central bank independence, globalization and other issues in contemporary economic governance.
目次
Notes on the Contributors Governance and New Institutional Economics: Some Introductory Remarks
Luigi Paganetto Why Poor Economic Policies must Promote Corruption: Lessons from the East for all Countries
Mancur Olson Inflation, Central Bank Independence, Labour and Financial Governance: Some Evidence from OECD Countries
Michele Bagella & Leonardo Becchetti Rules, Institutions and Crime: An Economist's Point of View
Fabio Gobbo Regulation of Capital Flows and Exchange Rate Volatility: Preliminary Results on the Italian Experience
Andrea Berardi, Alberto Dalmazzo & Giancarlo Marini Transaction Cost Politics and Economic Policy: A Framework and a Case-Study
Avinash Dixit An Economic Analysis of Proposals for Constitutional Fiscal Constraints
Giovanni Somogyi The Governance of a Globalising World Economy
Salvatore Zecchini Two Approaches to Economic Governance
Bruno Jossa Wage Control and Economic Performance
Carlo Dell'Aringa Origins of Bac Policies: Control, Corruption and Confusion
Andrei Shleifer Economic Theory and Institutions: An Introductory Note
Giovanni Caravale Conclusions
Edmund S.Phelps Index
