Modeling Bounded Rationality (Zeuthen Lecture Book Series)

Rubinstein, Ariel（著）

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詳しい情報

出版社: Mit Pr(1998-02-01)

ハードカバー: 208 ページ / 16.5 x 1.9 x 24.1 cm

ISBN-10: 0262181878 ISBN-13: 9780262181877

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版元ドットコムカスタマイズ

紹介

The notion of bounded rationality was initiated in the 1950s by Herbert Simon; only recently has it influenced mainstream economics. In this book, Ariel Rubinstein defines models of bounded rationality as those in which elements of the process of choice are explicitly embedded. The book focuses on the challenges of modeling bounded rationality, rather than on substantial economic implications. In the first part of the book, the author considers the modeling of choice. After discussing some psychological findings, he proceeds to the modeling of procedural rationality, knowledge, memory, the choice of what to know, and group decisions.In the second part, he discusses the fundamental difficulties of modeling bounded rationality in games. He begins with the modeling of a game with procedural rational players and then surveys repeated games with complexity considerations. He ends with a discussion of computability constraints in games. The final chapter includes a critique by Herbert Simon of the author's methodology and the author's response. The Zeuthen Lecture Book series is sponsored by the Institute of Economics at the University of Copenhagen.

Part 1 Introduction: "modelling" and "bounded rationality" the aim of this book the state of the art a personal note bibliographic notes. Part 2 Bounded rationality in choice: the "rational man" the traditional economist's position the attack on the traditional approach experimental evidence comments bibliographic notes projects. Part 3 Modelling procedural decision making: motivation preparing the tools - similarity relations a procedure of choice between vectors analysis case-based theory bibliographic notes projects. Part 4 Modelling knowledge: knowledge and bounded rationality information structure the set-theoretical definition of knowledge Kripke's model the impact of the timing of decisions and having more information on the possibility of speculative trade bibliographic notes projects. Part 5 Modelling limited memory: imperfect recall an extensive decision making model with imperfect information perfect and imperfect recall time consistency the role of randomization the multiselves approach on the problematics of using the model bibliographic notes projects. Part 6 Choosing what to know: optimal information structures what is "high" and what is "low"? manipulating informational restrictions perceptrons bibliographic notes projects. Part 7 Modelling complexity in group decisions: introduction the model of a team processing information aggregating preferences bibliographic notes projects. Part 8 Modelling bounded rationality in games: introduction interaction between Luce players a game with procedural rational players limited foresight in extensive games bibliographic notes projects. Part 9 Complexity considerations in repeated games: introduction the model of repeated games - a brief review strategies as machines in infinitely repeated games complexity considerations in repeated games the structure of machine games equilibria repeated extensive games concluding remarks bibliographic notes projects. Part 10 Attempting to resolve the finite horizon paradoxes: motivation implementation of strategies by machines counting is costly bounded capability to count machines also send messages the e-equilibrium approach - a deviation is costly conclusion bibliographic notes projects. Part 11 Computability constraints in games: introduction informal results on computability is there a rational player? Turing machine game bibliographic notes projects. Part 12 Final thoughts: Simon's critique response.

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