紹介
A Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 1999 Academic debates about pluralism and truth have become increasingly polarized in recent years. One side embraces extreme relativism, deeming any talk of objective truth as philosophically naive. The opposition, frequently arguing that any sort of relativism leads to nihilism, insists on an objective notion of truth according to which there is only one true story of the world. Both sides agree that there is no middle path. In Truth in Context, Michael Lynch argues that there is a middle path, one where metaphysical pluralism is consistent with a robust realism about truth. Drawing on the work of Hilary Putnam, W.V.O. Quine, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, among others, Lynch develops an original version of metaphysical pluralism, which he calls relativistic Kantianism. He argues that one can take facts and propositions as relative without implying that our ordinary concept of truth is a relative, epistemic, or "soft" concept. The truths may be relative, but our concept of truth need not be.
目次
Part 1 The faces of pluralism: the problem
faces of absolutism
the move to pluralism
metaphysical pluralism
facts and content
three objections. Part 2 Understanding conceptual schemes: three models
the Kantian model
the Quinean model
the Wittgensteinian model
the very idea. Part 3 Extending our worldview: concepts - two pictures
conceptual fluidity and family resemblance
conceptual fluidity and minimal concepts
concepts and change. Part 4 The nature of existence: dilemmas confronted
objects and existence
dilemmas resolved
the idealism objection. Part 5 The currents of truth: what is realism about truth?
antirealism about truth - epistemic theories
antirealism about truth - deflationary theories
the correspondence theory and pluralism
minimal realism about truth
relative truth. Part 6 The true and the real: relativism, inconsistency and self-reference
on stepping outside of my own skin
evaluating schemes
facing the noumena
the purpose of metaphysics.
